Costco Wholesale Corp /New (COST) Stock Analysis and Metrics

Costco Wholesale

NASDAQ: COST

$935.29 ▲ +9.23 (+1.00%)

At close: Jul 24, 2026 · 3:59 PM UTC

Financial Ratios

Market Cap410.89 Bn

P/E48.09

P/S1.44

Div. Yield0.01

Total Debt (Qtr)5.69 Bn

Revenue Growth (1y) (Qtr)9.22

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About

Costco Wholesale Corporation operates membership warehouses and e-commerce sites that offer low prices on a limited selection of nationally-branded and private-label products to achieve high sales volumes and rapid inventory turnover.

The company generated revenue from merchandise sales across categories such as foods, non-foods, fresh foods, and from ancillary services including gasoline, pharmacy, optical, food court, hearing aids, tire installation, e-commerce, business centers, and travel services, with gasoline representing approximately 10% of total net sales in 2025, e-commerce approximately 7%, and digitally-enabled sales approximately 10% of total net sales in 2025.

The company operates through the following segments: Core Merchandise, Warehouse Ancillary, and Other Businesses.

• Core Merchandise: This segment includes Foods and Sundries, Non-Foods, and Fresh Foods categories, offering a limited selection of nationally-branded and private-label products, with an average of fewer than 4,000 active stock keeping units per warehouse and a focus on fast-selling models, sizes, and colors.

• Warehouse Ancillary: This segment provides gasoline, pharmacy, optical, food court, hearing aids, and tire installation services located within or near warehouses, with 747 gas stations operated at the end of 2025 supporting the gasoline business that contributed about 10% of total net sales.

• Other Businesses: This segment comprises e-commerce operations that give members convenience and a broader selection of goods and services, business centers that carry items tailored for food services, convenience stores and offices, and travel services that offer vacation packages, car rentals, cruises and other travel products exclusively for Costco members.

Costco Wholesale Corporation holds a strong position in the warehouse club industry, competing with rivals such as Walmart’s Sam’s Club, BJ’s Wholesale Club, and traditional retailers including Walmart, Target, Kroger, and Amazon, leveraging its low-cost model, high inventory turnover, private-label Kirkland Signature brand, and membership renewal rates of 92.3% in the United States and Canada and 89.8% worldwide at the end of 2025.

The company serves individual consumers and businesses through its Gold Star, Business, and Executive memberships, with members accessing warehouses and e-commerce sites in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan, the United Kingdom, Korea, Australia, Taiwan, China, Spain, France, Sweden, Iceland, and New Zealand, and a total paid membership base of 81,000,000 at the end of 2025.

Investment Thesis

▲ Bull case

Costco’s strategic use of its strong balance sheet and operational flexibility positions it to capitalize on macroeconomic uncertainty through aggressive pricing actions that deepen customer loyalty and drive incremental spending, particularly as the company leverages its scale to absorb cost pressures while maintaining value perception. Management emphasized their commitment to being “the first to lower prices and the last to raise them,” a discipline reinforced by recent price reductions on Signature items like Kirkland Signature Crispy Wings, Milk Chocolate Almonds, golf balls, and king-size sheets. These moves, made possible by favorable LIFO laps and disciplined inventory management, signal a proactive approach to capturing market share during periods of consumer price sensitivity. The company’s ability to lower prices on core everyday goods while simultaneously investing in high-growth areas like pharmacy and e-commerce creates a virtuous cycle: lower prices increase traffic and basket size, which in turn supports higher-margin ancillary businesses. This dual strategy of defending value in core categories while expanding into higher-margin services is not merely reactive but a deliberate, sustainable tactic to strengthen the membership model. The fact that these price actions are being taken without eroding overall profitability — as evidenced by stable core margins ex-gas and improved SG&A leverage — demonstrates a level of pricing power and operational efficiency that competitors struggle to match. This approach is especially potent given the current macro backdrop, where consumers are actively seeking value, and Costco’s reputation for consistent low pricing makes it a natural beneficiary of shifting consumer behavior. The company’s willingness to invest in value now, even at the cost of near-term margin compression, is a long-term play to lock in loyalty and increase wallet share, which will pay dividends as economic conditions stabilize.
The early success of Costco’s executive membership rollout in China, coupled with strong penetration in existing markets, reveals a high-potential, underappreciated growth driver that extends beyond domestic saturation and could significantly boost lifetime customer value over the next decade. Management noted that the executive program in China has exceeded initial expectations, with higher-than-anticipated adoption rates and strong engagement, particularly due to the inclusion of extended hours and Instacart benefits. This is significant because executive members historically spend more, visit more frequently, and renew at higher rates — traits that are now being replicated in a high-growth international market with low penetration. With over 41.2 million executive members globally and a 9.6% year-over-year increase, the program is already a meaningful contributor to membership fee income growth, which rose 10.7% in the quarter. The international rollout, still in its early stages, has vast runway: China alone represents a massive untapped market, and the success there suggests replicability in other Asia-Pacific and European markets where Costco is expanding. Furthermore, the company’s ability to layer digital benefits like Instacart credits into the executive tier enhances perceived value without proportionally increasing cost, creating a high-margin upgrade path. As digital engagement continues to rise — evidenced by 37% growth in app and website traffic — the executive tier becomes an even more compelling proposition, especially as it integrates seamlessly with services like same-day delivery and personalized recommendations. This is not just a membership tier upgrade; it’s a platform for increasing engagement, reducing churn, and unlocking higher spend per member, all of which compound over time to drive sustainable, high-quality growth that is currently underappreciated by investors focused solely on comparable sales.
Costco’s investments in digital infrastructure and retail media are creating a stealthy, high-margin revenue stream that is being underestimated by the market, as the company leverages its unique first-party data and closed-loop ecosystem to deliver superior ad effectiveness and monetization potential. The company highlighted that personalized product recommendation carousels drove conversion rates three times higher than baseline and contributed just under $5 billion in e-commerce sales — a figure that underscores the scale and efficiency of its digital personalization efforts. Furthermore, the launch of the Google Commerce and Media and YouTube partnership marks a pivotal step in scaling retail media revenue, with management explicitly noting that 80–90% of the value generated is reinvested into the member experience to drive better pricing and top-line growth. This creates a self-reinforcing flywheel: better data and personalization lead to higher ad effectiveness, which attracts more brand spend, which in turn funds further member-centric innovations. Unlike traditional retailers that rely on broad, inefficient ad models, Costco’s closed ecosystem — where ads are shown only to verified members with proven purchase intent — offers advertisers unparalleled ROI, a fact that is beginning to resonate with partners. The company’s investment in AI to enhance product page visibility in large language models, while still early, showed triple-digit growth in traffic and the highest conversion rate of any traffic source, signaling a future where AI-driven discovery becomes a major acquisition channel. These initiatives are not being heavily promoted in earnings calls because they are still scaling, but their underlying metrics — conversion rates, sales contribution, and partnership traction — suggest a quiet but powerful evolution in monetization that could meaningfully expand operating margins over time without requiring commensurate increases in capital expenditure.
The company’s proactive management of tariff exposure through the Section 301 refund process represents a near-term catalyst that could significantly boost earnings and enable further value-pass-through to members, yet the market appears to be overlooking the timing and magnitude of this benefit. Management confirmed that refund claims have been submitted and expects to receive payments on approved claims on a rolling basis over the next two to three months, with the intention to return those funds to members “in some form.” While the exact mechanism and amount remain uncertain due to ongoing litigation, the fact that Costco is actively pursuing these refunds — unlike many peers who have not — signals a commitment to capturing every dollar of value owed. Given the company’s history of returning value to members via price cuts or special dividends when excess cash accumulates, it is highly likely that a portion of these refunds will be used to lower prices on key categories, reinforcing the “first to lower, last to raise” principle. This could trigger a renewed round of traffic and basket size growth, particularly in price-sensitive segments, while simultaneously improving member sentiment and retention. Moreover, the receipt of these funds would bolster cash reserves, providing additional flexibility for capital allocation — whether through accelerated store openings, increased share repurchases, or future special dividends — without compromising growth investments. The market’s focus on current quarterly results has caused it to overlook this impending inflow, which, even if conservative in estimate, could meaningfully boost EPS in the coming quarters and serve as a tangible validation of Costco’s ability to navigate complex trade environments while protecting member value.

Costco’s strategic use of its strong balance sheet and operational flexibility positions it to capitalize on macroeconomic uncertainty through aggressive pricing actions that deepen customer loyalty and drive incremental spending, particularly as the company leverages its scale to absorb cost pressures while maintaining value perception. Management emphasized their commitment to being “the first to lower prices and the last to raise them,” a discipline reinforced by recent price reductions on Signature items like Kirkland Signature Crispy Wings, Milk Chocolate Almonds, golf balls, and king-size sheets. These moves, made possible by favorable LIFO laps and disciplined inventory management, signal a proactive approach to capturing market share during periods of consumer price sensitivity. The company’s ability to lower prices on core everyday goods while simultaneously investing in high-growth areas like pharmacy and e-commerce creates a virtuous cycle: lower prices increase traffic and basket size, which in turn supports higher-margin ancillary businesses. This dual strategy of defending value in core categories while expanding into higher-margin services is not merely reactive but a deliberate, sustainable tactic to strengthen the membership model. The fact that these price actions are being taken without eroding overall profitability — as evidenced by stable core margins ex-gas and improved SG&A leverage — demonstrates a level of pricing power and operational efficiency that competitors struggle to match. This approach is especially potent given the current macro backdrop, where consumers are actively seeking value, and Costco’s reputation for consistent low pricing makes it a natural beneficiary of shifting consumer behavior. The company’s willingness to invest in value now, even at the cost of near-term margin compression, is a long-term play to lock in loyalty and increase wallet share, which will pay dividends as economic conditions stabilize.
The early success of Costco’s executive membership rollout in China, coupled with strong penetration in existing markets, reveals a high-potential, underappreciated growth driver that extends beyond domestic saturation and could significantly boost lifetime customer value over the next decade. Management noted that the executive program in China has exceeded initial expectations, with higher-than-anticipated adoption rates and strong engagement, particularly due to the inclusion of extended hours and Instacart benefits. This is significant because executive members historically spend more, visit more frequently, and renew at higher rates — traits that are now being replicated in a high-growth international market with low penetration. With over 41.2 million executive members globally and a 9.6% year-over-year increase, the program is already a meaningful contributor to membership fee income growth, which rose 10.7% in the quarter. The international rollout, still in its early stages, has vast runway: China alone represents a massive untapped market, and the success there suggests replicability in other Asia-Pacific and European markets where Costco is expanding. Furthermore, the company’s ability to layer digital benefits like Instacart credits into the executive tier enhances perceived value without proportionally increasing cost, creating a high-margin upgrade path. As digital engagement continues to rise — evidenced by 37% growth in app and website traffic — the executive tier becomes an even more compelling proposition, especially as it integrates seamlessly with services like same-day delivery and personalized recommendations. This is not just a membership tier upgrade; it’s a platform for increasing engagement, reducing churn, and unlocking higher spend per member, all of which compound over time to drive sustainable, high-quality growth that is currently underappreciated by investors focused solely on comparable sales.
Costco’s investments in digital infrastructure and retail media are creating a stealthy, high-margin revenue stream that is being underestimated by the market, as the company leverages its unique first-party data and closed-loop ecosystem to deliver superior ad effectiveness and monetization potential. The company highlighted that personalized product recommendation carousels drove conversion rates three times higher than baseline and contributed just under $5 billion in e-commerce sales — a figure that underscores the scale and efficiency of its digital personalization efforts. Furthermore, the launch of the Google Commerce and Media and YouTube partnership marks a pivotal step in scaling retail media revenue, with management explicitly noting that 80–90% of the value generated is reinvested into the member experience to drive better pricing and top-line growth. This creates a self-reinforcing flywheel: better data and personalization lead to higher ad effectiveness, which attracts more brand spend, which in turn funds further member-centric innovations. Unlike traditional retailers that rely on broad, inefficient ad models, Costco’s closed ecosystem — where ads are shown only to verified members with proven purchase intent — offers advertisers unparalleled ROI, a fact that is beginning to resonate with partners. The company’s investment in AI to enhance product page visibility in large language models, while still early, showed triple-digit growth in traffic and the highest conversion rate of any traffic source, signaling a future where AI-driven discovery becomes a major acquisition channel. These initiatives are not being heavily promoted in earnings calls because they are still scaling, but their underlying metrics — conversion rates, sales contribution, and partnership traction — suggest a quiet but powerful evolution in monetization that could meaningfully expand operating margins over time without requiring commensurate increases in capital expenditure.
The company’s proactive management of tariff exposure through the Section 301 refund process represents a near-term catalyst that could significantly boost earnings and enable further value-pass-through to members, yet the market appears to be overlooking the timing and magnitude of this benefit. Management confirmed that refund claims have been submitted and expects to receive payments on approved claims on a rolling basis over the next two to three months, with the intention to return those funds to members “in some form.” While the exact mechanism and amount remain uncertain due to ongoing litigation, the fact that Costco is actively pursuing these refunds — unlike many peers who have not — signals a commitment to capturing every dollar of value owed. Given the company’s history of returning value to members via price cuts or special dividends when excess cash accumulates, it is highly likely that a portion of these refunds will be used to lower prices on key categories, reinforcing the “first to lower, last to raise” principle. This could trigger a renewed round of traffic and basket size growth, particularly in price-sensitive segments, while simultaneously improving member sentiment and retention. Moreover, the receipt of these funds would bolster cash reserves, providing additional flexibility for capital allocation — whether through accelerated store openings, increased share repurchases, or future special dividends — without compromising growth investments. The market’s focus on current quarterly results has caused it to overlook this impending inflow, which, even if conservative in estimate, could meaningfully boost EPS in the coming quarters and serve as a tangible validation of Costco’s ability to navigate complex trade environments while protecting member value.

▼ Bear case

Costco’s reliance on gas-driven traffic and volume growth as a primary engine for comparable sales performance introduces a significant risk of volatility and misalignment with long-term trends, as the recent surge in fuel-related activity may be temporary and inversely correlated with sustainable retail health. While management highlighted record-breaking gas volumes and noted that new gas users tend to spend more in the warehouse, the underlying driver — elevated fuel prices due to geopolitical conflict — is inherently unstable and likely to reverse when prices decline. The company’s own acknowledgment that it “widened its gaps” in gas pricing to stimulate volume suggests a tactical, margin-compromising response to external conditions rather than a structural shift in consumer behavior. More concerning is the disconnect between gas-driven traffic and core merchandising performance: although overall comparable sales rose 9.8%, the ex-gas and FX-adjusted figure was a more modest 6.6%, indicating that the headline growth was substantially inflated by fuel. This raises questions about the quality of the traffic — are these new visitors truly engaged with the Costco model, or are they opportunistic, price-sensitive users who may disengage as soon as fuel prices stabilize? Furthermore, the company’s strategy of using gas as a loss leader to drive warehouse visits carries inherent risks: if fuel margins compress further or if competitors respond with aggressive fuel pricing, Costco could find itself in a costly battle that erodes profitability without guaranteed retention. The long-term value of converting gas-only visitors into loyal warehouse shoppers remains unproven, and the current enthusiasm may be mistaking a temporary arbitrage opportunity for a durable competitive advantage.
The company’s growing exposure to inflation in non-discretionary categories — particularly those tied to resin, memory chips, and synthetic materials — poses a creeping threat to gross margin stability that is being downplayed as transient, despite clear signals of structural cost pressures in key segments. Management acknowledged that higher resin costs are beginning to flow into the cost of goods for items with plastic components, polyester, or cotton, and that prices for appliances remain elevated due to expensive memory chips. While they noted efforts to buy forward inventory to mitigate impact, this is a tactical, short-term fix that does not address the root issue: Costco’s reliance on global supply chains for goods increasingly affected by commodity-driven inflation. Unlike food categories, where deflation in produce, eggs, and dairy provided relief, these non-food inflationary pressures are less likely to reverse quickly and may persist as long as energy prices remain elevated or supply chain constraints linger. The fact that core-on-core margins declined by 9 basis points — even after excluding gas inflation — suggests that the company is already absorbing cost increases in its core merchandising business, likely through a combination of reduced promotions, tighter vendor terms, or absorptive pricing. This erosion of margin discipline, particularly in categories like home furnishings and major appliances where Costco has traditionally leveraged scale for cost advantage, signals a potential weakening of its pricing power. If these pressures persist, the company may be forced to choose between passing costs to members (risking price perception) or absorbing them (further compressing margins), neither of which is ideal in an environment where consumers are already sensitive to value.
The deceleration in new membership growth to just 4.1% year-over-year — the lowest level in recent memory — signals a potential maturation of the domestic market and a weakening of the traditional growth engine that has historically fueled comparable sales, a trend that management’s explanations fail to fully convince as cyclical or temporary. While CFO Gary Millerchip attributed the slowdown to the absence of new store openings in major international markets and the lapping of strong prior-year performance, this overlooks the deeper concern: that the base of easily accessible, high-potential markets for new warehouse development is shrinking. The company’s guidance of 26 net new openings for FY26 — down from prior expectations — reflects a more conservative pipeline, and the reliance on relocating existing stores to larger formats (only two completed so far this year) suggests diminishing returns from physical expansion. Furthermore, the normalization of renewal rates, while presented as a positive sign of stability, may instead indicate that the rapid growth seen during and post-pandemic was anomalously high and not sustainable. The fact that digital-only members renew at lower rates, and that this segment is growing as a share of the base, creates a structural headwind to overall retention that targeted marketing may only partially offset. Without a resurgence in new warehouse openings — particularly in untapped geographies — or a breakthrough in digital acquisition that converts at parity with in-store sign-ups, the company’s ability to grow its membership base meaningfully is constrained. This is especially troubling given that membership fee income is a high-margin, recurring revenue stream, and any stagnation here directly limits the scalability of the entire model.
Costco’s increasing dependence on third-party partners for critical services like same-day delivery and fuel distribution introduces operational vulnerability and limits its ability to fully control the customer experience, a risk that is being underestimated as the company continues to tout partnerships as sufficient for competitive parity. While management expressed satisfaction with current third-party providers for same-day delivery — noting sub-45-minute average times and high satisfaction scores — they also acknowledged ongoing evaluation of whether to pursue greater vertical integration, implicitly admitting that the current model may not be sufficient long-term. The reliance on external actors for delivery speed and reliability means Costco is subject to the priorities, capacity constraints, and pricing power of partners who may not share its long-term commitment to member value. This is particularly precarious as competitors like Walmart and Amazon invest heavily in owned logistics networks to achieve same-day or even faster delivery at scale. Similarly, in the fuel business, while Costco benefits from high-volume transactions, it does not own or control the refining or logistics infrastructure that determines fuel availability and pricing — leaving it exposed to supply shocks or regional shortages that could disrupt service despite strong demand. The company’s strategy of leveraging partnerships for speed and convenience may work in the short term, but it creates a dependency that limits control over key touchpoints in the customer journey. As delivery expectations continue to rise and the line between physical and digital shopping blurs, the inability to guarantee end-to-end service quality through owned infrastructure could become a competitive disadvantage, especially if partners begin to prioritize their own margins or scale their services unevenly across regions. This lack of control represents a strategic vulnerability that is obscured by the current success of partner relationships but could manifest sharply under stress or in a more competitive environment.

Costco’s reliance on gas-driven traffic and volume growth as a primary engine for comparable sales performance introduces a significant risk of volatility and misalignment with long-term trends, as the recent surge in fuel-related activity may be temporary and inversely correlated with sustainable retail health. While management highlighted record-breaking gas volumes and noted that new gas users tend to spend more in the warehouse, the underlying driver — elevated fuel prices due to geopolitical conflict — is inherently unstable and likely to reverse when prices decline. The company’s own acknowledgment that it “widened its gaps” in gas pricing to stimulate volume suggests a tactical, margin-compromising response to external conditions rather than a structural shift in consumer behavior. More concerning is the disconnect between gas-driven traffic and core merchandising performance: although overall comparable sales rose 9.8%, the ex-gas and FX-adjusted figure was a more modest 6.6%, indicating that the headline growth was substantially inflated by fuel. This raises questions about the quality of the traffic — are these new visitors truly engaged with the Costco model, or are they opportunistic, price-sensitive users who may disengage as soon as fuel prices stabilize? Furthermore, the company’s strategy of using gas as a loss leader to drive warehouse visits carries inherent risks: if fuel margins compress further or if competitors respond with aggressive fuel pricing, Costco could find itself in a costly battle that erodes profitability without guaranteed retention. The long-term value of converting gas-only visitors into loyal warehouse shoppers remains unproven, and the current enthusiasm may be mistaking a temporary arbitrage opportunity for a durable competitive advantage.
The company’s growing exposure to inflation in non-discretionary categories — particularly those tied to resin, memory chips, and synthetic materials — poses a creeping threat to gross margin stability that is being downplayed as transient, despite clear signals of structural cost pressures in key segments. Management acknowledged that higher resin costs are beginning to flow into the cost of goods for items with plastic components, polyester, or cotton, and that prices for appliances remain elevated due to expensive memory chips. While they noted efforts to buy forward inventory to mitigate impact, this is a tactical, short-term fix that does not address the root issue: Costco’s reliance on global supply chains for goods increasingly affected by commodity-driven inflation. Unlike food categories, where deflation in produce, eggs, and dairy provided relief, these non-food inflationary pressures are less likely to reverse quickly and may persist as long as energy prices remain elevated or supply chain constraints linger. The fact that core-on-core margins declined by 9 basis points — even after excluding gas inflation — suggests that the company is already absorbing cost increases in its core merchandising business, likely through a combination of reduced promotions, tighter vendor terms, or absorptive pricing. This erosion of margin discipline, particularly in categories like home furnishings and major appliances where Costco has traditionally leveraged scale for cost advantage, signals a potential weakening of its pricing power. If these pressures persist, the company may be forced to choose between passing costs to members (risking price perception) or absorbing them (further compressing margins), neither of which is ideal in an environment where consumers are already sensitive to value.
The deceleration in new membership growth to just 4.1% year-over-year — the lowest level in recent memory — signals a potential maturation of the domestic market and a weakening of the traditional growth engine that has historically fueled comparable sales, a trend that management’s explanations fail to fully convince as cyclical or temporary. While CFO Gary Millerchip attributed the slowdown to the absence of new store openings in major international markets and the lapping of strong prior-year performance, this overlooks the deeper concern: that the base of easily accessible, high-potential markets for new warehouse development is shrinking. The company’s guidance of 26 net new openings for FY26 — down from prior expectations — reflects a more conservative pipeline, and the reliance on relocating existing stores to larger formats (only two completed so far this year) suggests diminishing returns from physical expansion. Furthermore, the normalization of renewal rates, while presented as a positive sign of stability, may instead indicate that the rapid growth seen during and post-pandemic was anomalously high and not sustainable. The fact that digital-only members renew at lower rates, and that this segment is growing as a share of the base, creates a structural headwind to overall retention that targeted marketing may only partially offset. Without a resurgence in new warehouse openings — particularly in untapped geographies — or a breakthrough in digital acquisition that converts at parity with in-store sign-ups, the company’s ability to grow its membership base meaningfully is constrained. This is especially troubling given that membership fee income is a high-margin, recurring revenue stream, and any stagnation here directly limits the scalability of the entire model.
Costco’s increasing dependence on third-party partners for critical services like same-day delivery and fuel distribution introduces operational vulnerability and limits its ability to fully control the customer experience, a risk that is being underestimated as the company continues to tout partnerships as sufficient for competitive parity. While management expressed satisfaction with current third-party providers for same-day delivery — noting sub-45-minute average times and high satisfaction scores — they also acknowledged ongoing evaluation of whether to pursue greater vertical integration, implicitly admitting that the current model may not be sufficient long-term. The reliance on external actors for delivery speed and reliability means Costco is subject to the priorities, capacity constraints, and pricing power of partners who may not share its long-term commitment to member value. This is particularly precarious as competitors like Walmart and Amazon invest heavily in owned logistics networks to achieve same-day or even faster delivery at scale. Similarly, in the fuel business, while Costco benefits from high-volume transactions, it does not own or control the refining or logistics infrastructure that determines fuel availability and pricing — leaving it exposed to supply shocks or regional shortages that could disrupt service despite strong demand. The company’s strategy of leveraging partnerships for speed and convenience may work in the short term, but it creates a dependency that limits control over key touchpoints in the customer journey. As delivery expectations continue to rise and the line between physical and digital shopping blurs, the inability to guarantee end-to-end service quality through owned infrastructure could become a competitive disadvantage, especially if partners begin to prioritize their own margins or scale their services unevenly across regions. This lack of control represents a strategic vulnerability that is obscured by the current success of partner relationships but could manifest sharply under stress or in a more competitive environment.

Segments Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

Companies in the Discount Stores

S.No.	Ticker	Company	Market Cap	P/E	P/S	Total Debt (Qtr)
1	WMT	Walmart Inc.	862.66 Bn	37.36	1.19	47.56 Bn
2	COST	Costco Wholesale Corp /New	410.89 Bn	48.09	1.44	5.69 Bn
3	TGT	Target Corp	61.06 Bn	17.52	0.57	15.42 Bn
4	DG	Dollar General Corp	25.36 Bn	16.76	0.59	4.58 Bn
5	DLTR	Dollar Tree, Inc.	22.75 Bn	848.11	1.15	2.93 Bn
6	BJ	BJ's Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc.	11.75 Bn	20.56	0.53	0.77 Bn
7	PSMT	Pricesmart Inc	5.65 Bn	35.18	0.99	0.12 Bn
8	TBBB	Bbb Foods Inc	4.68 Bn	3.93	1.03	0.02 Bn

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Investment Thesis

Product and Service Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Segments Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

Research Tools

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Investment Thesis

Product and Service Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Segments Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

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