Strive SATS

NASDAQ SATS
$95.45 +0.56 (+0.59%)
As of: Oct 29, 2026 · 2:27 PM EDT

Strive (SATS) stock price is $95.45, up 0.59% on the day, as of Oct 29, 2026. It has a market cap of $1.10Bn, and is classified in the Asset Management industry (Financial Services sector).

Key Stats
Market Cap1.10 Bn
P/E-2.59
FCF (Yr)–
ROA (Yr)–
EV to EBIT-4.05
Net Income (Yr)–
Enterprise Value1.02 Bn
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About

Strive, Inc. is a structured finance company and institutional asset manager that focuses on disciplined capital allocation and long term value creation. The firm adopted bitcoin as its hurdle rate for capital deployment to fulfill its fiduciary duty to maximize long term stockholder value and to compound purchasing power over time. Strive’s operating business generates stockholder value through disciplined balance sheet management and the growth of its bitcoin holdings.…

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Sectors: Financial Services Healthcare Sector rationale Strive's primary business is institutional asset management and structured finance, generating revenue from fee-based income tied to assets under management (AUM) and financing spreads from its SATA Stock. The company also operates a substantial and distinct business line through its subsidiary Semler Scientific, which develops and markets the QuantaFlo FDA-cleared vascular testing device to hospitals and physician groups, fitting the Healthcare sector. Industries: Asset Management Asset Management Primary Strive operates as an institutional asset manager with over 2.4 billion dollars in assets under management, generating recurring fee-based revenue tied to its AUM. Its core activity involves managing a bitcoin treasury strategy and deploying capital to maximize long-term stockholder value. Diagnostic Equipment Diagnostic Equipment Secondary Through its subsidiary Semler Scientific, the company markets the QuantaFlo FDA cleared vascular testing device, which is a sensor-based product used for in-office blood flow tests. Revenue is derived from licensing fees and service agreements tied to the volume of tests performed using this diagnostic equipment. Classified using BQ-MICS CIK: 0001920406
Bull & bear

Investment Thesis

▲ Bull case
  • EchoStar (SATS) is significantly underestimating the strategic value of its globally licensed S-band spectrum and domestic AWS-4 holdings as foundational assets for a vertically integrated direct-to-device (D2D) ecosystem. While the company acknowledges these spectrum rights as key differentiators, it has not quantified the potential revenue streams from enabling seamless satellite-to-smartphone connectivity for messaging and emergency services—features increasingly mandated by regulators and expected by consumers. The company's ability to execute this entirely in-house, leveraging its dual role as both a satellite operator (via Hughes) and a terrestrial 5G O-RAN network operator (via Boost Mobile), eliminates dependency on third-party partnerships and avoids revenue-sharing arrangements that competitors like Apple and Globalstar must navigate. This structural advantage positions EchoStar to capture disproportionate value in the emerging D2D market, where early movers could establish de facto standards, especially as handset manufacturers begin integrating chipsets capable of utilizing S-band frequencies by 2026–2027. The market is failing to price in the optionality of this long-term asset, which could evolve into a high-margin, globally scalable service layer atop existing infrastructure.
  • EchoStar's recent acceleration in 5G network deployment—surpassing 24,000 on-air sites over a month ahead of the FCC's June 14 deadline for 3GPP Release 17 compliance—signals a transition from capital-intensive build-out to operational optimization and monetization, a shift the market is overlooking. By reducing wireless capital expenditures from $391 million in Q1 2024 to $164 million in Q1 2025 while simultaneously improving key performance indicators like 2.7% sequential wireless service revenue growth and 7.2% year-over-year churn improvement, the company demonstrates that its network is now generating organic traction without requiring sustained peak investment. This efficiency gain, driven by higher on-net activation rates (over 75% of compatible new devices in accelerated markets) and the migration of traffic to its owned infrastructure, directly improves unit economics and paves the way for expanding operating margins. The market continues to view the wireless segment through the lens of build-out costs rather than recognizing the inflection point where scale and optimization begin to yield sustainable profitability, particularly as the company targets positive operating free cash flow for the full year.
  • EchoStar's Hughes division is quietly building a high-margin, recurring-revenue enterprise franchise through its globally deployed multi-orbit managed network, yet management has not emphasized the scalability of this model beyond isolated wins in Latin America and contracts in Europe and India. The deployment of SD-WAN and AI operations capabilities over hybrid satellite-terrestrial infrastructure addresses a critical and growing need for resilient, secure connectivity in underserved or geopolitically volatile regions—exactly the use case that aligns with rising demand from multinational enterprises, NGOs, and government agencies seeking alternatives to terrestrial-only networks. Unlike the consumer-facing HughesNet business, which faces churn and ARPU pressures, the enterprise segment benefits from longer contract durations, higher average revenue per user, and less sensitivity to macroeconomic fluctuations. The recent expansion into Brazilian national parks and the Airbus HBCplus partnership—which enables line-fit installation of connectivity terminals during aircraft manufacturing—further de-risks revenue visibility and creates defensible, sticky relationships with OEMs and system integrators. The market remains fixated on declining legacy broadband and Pay-TV subscribers, failing to recognize that Hughes is evolving into a solutions-oriented provider with defensible niche advantages in global enterprise connectivity.
▼ Bear case
  • EchoStar (SATS) faces a structural deterioration in its Pay-TV business that management is understating by highlighting improved churn and ARPU while avoiding discussion of the long-term secular decline in traditional satellite television. Despite reporting a reduction in DISH TV churn to 1.36% (down from 1.53%) and a $3 year-over-year ARPU increase, the segment lost approximately 140,000 subscribers quarter-over-quarter (implied from 5.5 million ending Q1 2025 versus ~5.64 million in Q4 2024), continuing a multi-year trend where satellite TV is being displaced by streaming alternatives and virtual MVPDs. The company’s reliance on price increases to boost ARPU is unsustainable in a price-sensitive market, and further hikes risk accelerating churn, especially as competitors like YouTube TV and Hulu + Live TV offer more flexible, lower-cost bundles. Management’s focus on operational efficiency and customer loyalty initiatives, while tactically sound, does not address the fundamental shift in consumer behavior toward on-demand, ad-supported, or skinny bundles—trends that are unlikely to reverse. The market may already be pricing in this decline, but EchoStar’s reluctance to discuss long-term subscriber trajectories or potential strategic alternatives (such as deeper integration with Sling or OTT pivots) suggests a lack of a credible plan to arrest the erosion of its core video franchise, leaving the segment vulnerable to continued pressure.
  • EchoStar’s wireless segment remains dependent on unsustainable marketing spend to drive subscriber growth, with the company acknowledging that increased promotional activity during tax season contributed to the 150,000 net adds in Q1 2025—a tactic that directly contributed to the widening OIBDA loss from ($363 million) to ($415 million) year-over-year. While the company frames this as a necessary investment to capture value-conscious customers, it has not demonstrated a clear path to reducing customer acquisition costs (CAC) or increasing organic growth through product differentiation alone. The reliance on seasonal purchasing power (tax refunds) creates volatility in quarterly performance, and the absence of sustained organic momentum raises concerns about the durability of the current subscriber base. Furthermore, the company’s stated goal to eliminate the prepaid/postpaid distinction introduces execution risk, as it requires significant changes to billing systems, credit assessment protocols, and retail channel incentives—changes that could disrupt current momentum if not managed carefully. The market may be assuming that improved network quality and organic growth will eventually reduce marketing dependence, but EchoStar has provided no concrete timeline or measurable milestones to support this transition, leaving the wireless segment’s profitability contingent on continued elevated spending.
  • EchoStar’s ambitious low Earth orbit (LEO) direct-to-device (D2D) initiative, while strategically compelling, faces significant execution and timing risks that the market is not fully appreciating, particularly given the company’s own admission that it is delaying satellite launches until a sufficient base of compatible handsets exists. The firm’s reliance on waiting for third-party chipset and device manufacturers to integrate S-band capabilities into mass-market smartphones introduces a critical dependency outside its control, with no guarantee that major OEMs will prioritize this feature given competing investments in 5G terrestrial bands and existing partnerships with Starlink and Lynk for satellite messaging. Even if handset readiness aligns with EchoStar’s timeline, the company must still successfully launch and operate a constellation—a capital-intensive endeavor where delays, technical failures, or regulatory hurdles could erode first-mover advantages. Moreover, the regulatory landscape is shifting, as evidenced by recent European Union discussions indicating that two-thirds of valuable mobile-satellite spectrum may be reserved for European firms, potentially limiting EchoStar’s ability to monetize its S-band rights globally. The market may be attributing excessive upside to the D2D vision without sufficiently discounting for the execution complexity, external dependencies, and geopolitical headwinds that could delay or diminish returns on this long-term bet.

Product and Service Breakdown of Revenue (2024)

History

Segments Breakdown of Revenue (2024)

History
Peer percentiles

How Strive ranks

Ranked against the 209 companies in Asset and Wealth Management58 metrics · as of Oct 30, 2026

Valuation

12 metrics · Lower multiples rank higher; a negative multiple ranks last
  • P/ENegative earnings −2.59xMedian 33.5x 10th
  • P/FCFNegative free cash flow −25.4xMedian 14.3x 15th
  • P/Operating cash flowNegative operating cash flow −25.4xMedian 12.8x 14th
  • P/S 245xMedian 4.85x 5th
  • P/B 1.88xMedian 1.81x 49th
  • P/Tangible book 1.88xMedian 1.99x 53rd
  • EV/EBITDANegative EBITDA −4.11xMedian 12.0x 9th
  • EV/EBITNegative EBIT −4.10xMedian 13.5x 7th
  • EV/Revenue 229xMedian 4.89x 3rd
  • EV/FCFNegative free cash flow −23.8xMedian 14.5x 14th
  • EV/Operating cash flowNegative operating cash flow −23.8xMedian 12.9x 12th
  • PEG (3Y EPS CAGR)Negative earnings 0.17Median 0.97 Not meaningful —
Peer group

Peer Comparison

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1 BLK BlackRock, Inc. 182.29 Bn24.736.39-
2 GLD Spdr Gold Trust 129.74 Bn5.76--
3 BX Blackstone Inc. 90.76 Bn27.415.6313.19 Bn
4 BN BROOKFIELD Corp /ON/ 88.75 Bn70.601.1614.71 Bn
5 KKR KKR & Co. Inc. 86.02 Bn28.704.0453.48 Bn
6 BAM Brookfield Asset Management Ltd. 77.61 Bn27.6713.533.47 Bn
7 APO Apollo Global Management, Inc. 68.28 Bn39.461.9013.73 Bn
8 ASST Strive, Inc. 1.10 Bn-2.59244.54-