DigitalBridge Group, Inc. (DBRG) Stock Analysis and Metrics

DigitalBridge

NYSE: DBRG

$15.90 ▲ +0.06 (+0.35%)

At close: Jul 24, 2026 · 3:59 PM UTC

Financial Ratios

Market Cap2.89 Bn

P/E31.77

P/S13.81

Div. Yield0.01

Total Debt (Qtr)299.21 Mn

Revenue Growth (1y) (Qtr)-19.86

Add ratio to table…

About

DigitalBridge Group, Inc. is a leading global investment manager in digital infrastructure. The firm deploys and manages capital across the digital ecosystem including data centers, cell towers and fiber networks. Its head office is in Boca Raton, Florida with additional offices in New York, London, Luxembourg and Singapore. At December 31, 2025 the company reported $41.0 billion of fee earning equity under management. DigitalBridge Group, Inc. employed 316 people worldwide. It operates as a taxable C corporation and conducts substantially all of its activities through its Operating Company, DigitalBridge Operating Company, LLC.

DigitalBridge Group, Inc. generates revenue primarily through management fees, incentive fees and carried interest from the investment funds it sponsors. Management fees are charged based on committed or invested capital according to the fund type. Incentive fees are earned when fund performance exceeds agreed hurdles. Carried interest represents a share of returns above a preferred return threshold. The firm also receives fees from sub advisory accounts and co investment vehicles. Its revenue streams are supported by a diverse global investor base that includes public and private pensions, sovereign wealth funds, asset managers, insurance companies and endowments.

The company operates through the following segments.

• DigitalBridge Partners (DBP) value added funds focus on investing in and building businesses across data centers, cell towers, fiber networks, small cells and edge infrastructure.

• Core Equity invests in stabilized digital infrastructure platforms with long duration cash flow profiles primarily in developed geographies through the Strategic Assets Fund (SAF).

• DigitalBridge Credit provides credit solutions to corporate borrowers in the digital infrastructure sector globally through products such as first lien term loans, second lien term loans, mezzanine debt and preferred equity.

• Liquid Strategies are fundamental long only, long short and market neutral public equities strategies with well defined mandates that leverage the firm’s network to build liquid portfolios of high quality undervalued businesses across digital infrastructure, real estate and technology, media and telecom.

• InfraBridge is a middle market equity investor specializing in digital infrastructure, energy and digital adjacent areas of traditional infrastructure mainly transportation and logistics via the Global Infrastructure Fund (GIF) series of funds.

DigitalBridge Group, Inc. holds a leading position as a global investment manager focused on digital infrastructure assets such as data centers, cell towers and fiber networks. The firm competes with other private equity and infrastructure sponsors, credit and hedge fund sponsors, REITs and other asset managers that pursue similar strategies. Competitive advantages stem from its deep operational experience, extensive relationships with carriers, content providers and hyperscale cloud companies, a differentiated mergers and acquisitions program that sources proprietary deal flow and its expertise in structuring portfolio company balance sheets to achieve favorable financing terms.

DigitalBridge Group, Inc. serves a diverse group of institutional investors that includes public and private pension plans, sovereign wealth funds, asset management firms, insurance companies and educational endowments. These clients provide the capital that the firm allocates across its various investment strategies.

Investment Thesis

▲ Bull case

DigitalBridge is positioned to capture massive value from the AI infrastructure buildout due to its unique power bank advantage, which remains underappreciated by the market. The company has assembled a secured power bank of nearly 21 gigawatts across its portfolio, a critical bottleneck that competitors lack, enabling faster deployment of data centers for hyperscalers. This advantage is amplified by the Takanock platform, which develops powered land in high-demand markets like Northern Virginia and Phoenix, allowing customers to bypass years-long utility interconnection delays and deploy AI capacity within 9 to 18 months. Management emphasized that power is the single biggest constraint in AI infrastructure, and DigitalBridge’s integrated approach—combining data center platforms (Vantage, Switch, Yondr) with power solutions—creates a differentiated value proposition that others cannot replicate. The market is underestimating how this power bank translates into superior leasing velocity and pricing power, as evidenced by the leasing pipeline growing over 50% year-over-year and the ability to secure long-term contracts with hyperscalers who prioritize speed to market. With DigitalBridge’s share of the anticipated $43 billion CapEx deployment through 2026 at just under $30 billion, the embedded value in its platform is substantial and likely to drive multiple expansion as investors recognize the scarcity of power-ready assets in the AI boom.
The co-investment program is a stealth margin engine that is structurally improving and will sustainably boost FRE growth beyond current guidance. DigitalBridge has increased its average co-investment fee rate from 45 basis points to 60 basis points year-to-date, a 30% increase driven by LP demand for direct exposure to high-performing platforms like Switch and Vantage. This shift reflects a strategic success in attracting high-conviction capital from sophisticated investors who pay premium fees for access to DigitalBridge’s operational expertise and deal flow. Unlike traditional fee income that relies on fundraising volume, co-investment fees are scalable, high-margin, and require minimal incremental capital to generate—directly flowing to FRE with no associated expense. Management noted that this was a deliberate multi-year effort to change the narrative on co-invest, and the success is already visible in the 23% year-over-year FRE growth in Q2. As the company scales platforms like Yondr and Switch into larger AI campuses (e.g., Switch’s $3 billion Nevada AI campus), the pipeline for co-investment will expand, creating a recurring, high-margin revenue stream that is less volatile than fundraising-driven FEEUM growth. The market is overlooking how this fee rate expansion, combined with the maturation of flagship funds, will lift LTM FRE margins above the current 36% and sustain them through 2026, providing a durable floor for earnings growth even if fundraising moderates.
The pending acquisition of ArcLight, while framed as contingent on the SoftBank deal, represents a transformative vertical integration that will unlock significant synergies and reduce execution risk in DigitalBridge’s power strategy. By bringing ArcLight’s 85-person power development organization and its pipeline exceeding 15 GW of power projects in-house, DigitalBridge eliminates reliance on external partners for critical power infrastructure, accelerating project timelines and improving margins on Takanock and other power-centric initiatives. ArcLight’s deep expertise in generation, transmission, and behind-the-meter infrastructure—backed by over 70 GW of managed assets and $90 billion in enterprise value—complements DigitalBridge’s data center platforms, creating a fully integrated solution for the AI economy that addresses both power and compute needs. The market is treating this as a financial engineering footnote tied to the SoftBank Acquisition, but the strategic logic is compelling: DigitalBridge can now offer turnkey power-and-data-center solutions to hyperscalers, capturing more value per project and increasing customer stickiness. This integration reduces the risk of delays in power availability—a key concern management repeatedly highlighted—and positions DigitalBridge to win larger, more complex AI infrastructure contracts that require coordinated power and compute solutions, thereby increasing both the size and profitability of its addressable market.

DigitalBridge is positioned to capture massive value from the AI infrastructure buildout due to its unique power bank advantage, which remains underappreciated by the market. The company has assembled a secured power bank of nearly 21 gigawatts across its portfolio, a critical bottleneck that competitors lack, enabling faster deployment of data centers for hyperscalers. This advantage is amplified by the Takanock platform, which develops powered land in high-demand markets like Northern Virginia and Phoenix, allowing customers to bypass years-long utility interconnection delays and deploy AI capacity within 9 to 18 months. Management emphasized that power is the single biggest constraint in AI infrastructure, and DigitalBridge’s integrated approach—combining data center platforms (Vantage, Switch, Yondr) with power solutions—creates a differentiated value proposition that others cannot replicate. The market is underestimating how this power bank translates into superior leasing velocity and pricing power, as evidenced by the leasing pipeline growing over 50% year-over-year and the ability to secure long-term contracts with hyperscalers who prioritize speed to market. With DigitalBridge’s share of the anticipated $43 billion CapEx deployment through 2026 at just under $30 billion, the embedded value in its platform is substantial and likely to drive multiple expansion as investors recognize the scarcity of power-ready assets in the AI boom.
The co-investment program is a stealth margin engine that is structurally improving and will sustainably boost FRE growth beyond current guidance. DigitalBridge has increased its average co-investment fee rate from 45 basis points to 60 basis points year-to-date, a 30% increase driven by LP demand for direct exposure to high-performing platforms like Switch and Vantage. This shift reflects a strategic success in attracting high-conviction capital from sophisticated investors who pay premium fees for access to DigitalBridge’s operational expertise and deal flow. Unlike traditional fee income that relies on fundraising volume, co-investment fees are scalable, high-margin, and require minimal incremental capital to generate—directly flowing to FRE with no associated expense. Management noted that this was a deliberate multi-year effort to change the narrative on co-invest, and the success is already visible in the 23% year-over-year FRE growth in Q2. As the company scales platforms like Yondr and Switch into larger AI campuses (e.g., Switch’s $3 billion Nevada AI campus), the pipeline for co-investment will expand, creating a recurring, high-margin revenue stream that is less volatile than fundraising-driven FEEUM growth. The market is overlooking how this fee rate expansion, combined with the maturation of flagship funds, will lift LTM FRE margins above the current 36% and sustain them through 2026, providing a durable floor for earnings growth even if fundraising moderates.
The pending acquisition of ArcLight, while framed as contingent on the SoftBank deal, represents a transformative vertical integration that will unlock significant synergies and reduce execution risk in DigitalBridge’s power strategy. By bringing ArcLight’s 85-person power development organization and its pipeline exceeding 15 GW of power projects in-house, DigitalBridge eliminates reliance on external partners for critical power infrastructure, accelerating project timelines and improving margins on Takanock and other power-centric initiatives. ArcLight’s deep expertise in generation, transmission, and behind-the-meter infrastructure—backed by over 70 GW of managed assets and $90 billion in enterprise value—complements DigitalBridge’s data center platforms, creating a fully integrated solution for the AI economy that addresses both power and compute needs. The market is treating this as a financial engineering footnote tied to the SoftBank Acquisition, but the strategic logic is compelling: DigitalBridge can now offer turnkey power-and-data-center solutions to hyperscalers, capturing more value per project and increasing customer stickiness. This integration reduces the risk of delays in power availability—a key concern management repeatedly highlighted—and positions DigitalBridge to win larger, more complex AI infrastructure contracts that require coordinated power and compute solutions, thereby increasing both the size and profitability of its addressable market.

▼ Bear case

DigitalBridge’s growth is increasingly dependent on volatile fundraising cycles and temporary catch-up fees, creating sustainability risks in FRE growth that the market is overlooking. While FRE grew 23% year-over-year in Q2, management explicitly stated that excluding catch-up fees, the LTM FRE margin was only about 32%, suggesting that the margin expansion is partly driven by non-recurring items. Catch-up fees, which are retroactive collections tied to fund closings, are inherently lumpy and cannot be relied upon for consistent quarterly growth. Furthermore, CFO Mayrhofer warned that FEEUM growth is likely to moderate in the next quarter or two as distributions from the portfolio offset new capital raised, indicating that the current 21% year-over-year FEEUM increase may not be sustainable without a continuous influx of new commitments. The company’s guidance for FRE growth of 10%-20% for the year appears aggressive given this dynamic, especially as the flagship DBP III fund approaches its final close in Q3, after which the boost from catch-up fees will diminish. Investors may be assuming that the current trajectory of FEEUM and FRE growth will continue linearly, but the business model remains heavily tied to capital formation cycles, making earnings susceptible to slowdowns in fundraising environment or LP appetite shifts—risks that are not fully priced into the stock given the premium valuation implied by management’s confidence.
The company’s massive CapEx deployment plans, particularly the anticipated $43 billion in portfolio-wide investments through 2026, carry significant execution and financing risks that are underappreciated in the current bullish narrative. DigitalBridge acknowledges that building AI factories requires immense capital, with its own share nearing $30 billion, yet it has only $158 million in available corporate cash and a reduced revolver capacity of $100 million, leaving it highly dependent on external financing to fund its share of these projects. While Switch successfully expanded its credit facilities to $10 billion and retired prior debt, this reflects project-level financing, not corporate-level liquidity for DigitalBridge as the GP. The company’s strategy of seeding new fund initiatives and relying on co-investment inflows to drive FEEUM growth may not generate sufficient internal cash flow to support its ambitious CapEx plans without increasing leverage at the holdco level or diluting shareholders through equity issuances. Moreover, the realized $40 million loss from an InfraBridge fund investment—though deemed non-cash impacting—highlights the risks in its principal investment portfolio, suggesting that not all seeded investments will succeed. The market is assuming that the pipeline of 5.4 gigawatts under construction will seamlessly translate into leased capacity and carried interest, but delays in construction, cost overruns, or weaker-than-expected leasing demand (especially if AI ROI disappoints) could leave significant capital idle, impairing returns and straining liquidity.
Carried interest realization remains distant and episodic, creating a significant misalignment between current investor expectations and the actual timeline for value extraction, which the market is ignoring despite management’s own guidance. DigitalBridge’s funds are relatively young vintages—2019 for Fund I and 2022 for Fund II—and Ganzi explicitly stated that meaningful carried interest from the 2019 fund is not expected until 2026 and 2027, with the 2022 fund not yielding carry until 2029 and 2030. This implies that shareholders should not anticipate material DPI or carried interest income in the near term, yet the stock may be priced as if near-term carry is imminent. The GAAP carried interest reversal in the quarter, driven by small changes in fair value failing to exceed preferred return hurdles, underscores the volatility and unpredictability of accrued carry, especially in early-to-mid life cycle funds. While management emphasizes the embedded value in the development pipeline (e.g., $1 billion of potential future carry from 5.4 gigawatts), this remains theoretical and unrealized, subject to years of execution risk, market shifts, and exit environment volatility. Investors may be overestimating the proximity of carry-driven upside, leading to disappointment if the market realizes that the bulk of value creation is locked in long-term infrastructure holds with no near-term liquidity events, making the stock vulnerable to a multiple compression if growth expectations are not met alongside tangible cash returns.

DigitalBridge’s growth is increasingly dependent on volatile fundraising cycles and temporary catch-up fees, creating sustainability risks in FRE growth that the market is overlooking. While FRE grew 23% year-over-year in Q2, management explicitly stated that excluding catch-up fees, the LTM FRE margin was only about 32%, suggesting that the margin expansion is partly driven by non-recurring items. Catch-up fees, which are retroactive collections tied to fund closings, are inherently lumpy and cannot be relied upon for consistent quarterly growth. Furthermore, CFO Mayrhofer warned that FEEUM growth is likely to moderate in the next quarter or two as distributions from the portfolio offset new capital raised, indicating that the current 21% year-over-year FEEUM increase may not be sustainable without a continuous influx of new commitments. The company’s guidance for FRE growth of 10%-20% for the year appears aggressive given this dynamic, especially as the flagship DBP III fund approaches its final close in Q3, after which the boost from catch-up fees will diminish. Investors may be assuming that the current trajectory of FEEUM and FRE growth will continue linearly, but the business model remains heavily tied to capital formation cycles, making earnings susceptible to slowdowns in fundraising environment or LP appetite shifts—risks that are not fully priced into the stock given the premium valuation implied by management’s confidence.
The company’s massive CapEx deployment plans, particularly the anticipated $43 billion in portfolio-wide investments through 2026, carry significant execution and financing risks that are underappreciated in the current bullish narrative. DigitalBridge acknowledges that building AI factories requires immense capital, with its own share nearing $30 billion, yet it has only $158 million in available corporate cash and a reduced revolver capacity of $100 million, leaving it highly dependent on external financing to fund its share of these projects. While Switch successfully expanded its credit facilities to $10 billion and retired prior debt, this reflects project-level financing, not corporate-level liquidity for DigitalBridge as the GP. The company’s strategy of seeding new fund initiatives and relying on co-investment inflows to drive FEEUM growth may not generate sufficient internal cash flow to support its ambitious CapEx plans without increasing leverage at the holdco level or diluting shareholders through equity issuances. Moreover, the realized $40 million loss from an InfraBridge fund investment—though deemed non-cash impacting—highlights the risks in its principal investment portfolio, suggesting that not all seeded investments will succeed. The market is assuming that the pipeline of 5.4 gigawatts under construction will seamlessly translate into leased capacity and carried interest, but delays in construction, cost overruns, or weaker-than-expected leasing demand (especially if AI ROI disappoints) could leave significant capital idle, impairing returns and straining liquidity.
Carried interest realization remains distant and episodic, creating a significant misalignment between current investor expectations and the actual timeline for value extraction, which the market is ignoring despite management’s own guidance. DigitalBridge’s funds are relatively young vintages—2019 for Fund I and 2022 for Fund II—and Ganzi explicitly stated that meaningful carried interest from the 2019 fund is not expected until 2026 and 2027, with the 2022 fund not yielding carry until 2029 and 2030. This implies that shareholders should not anticipate material DPI or carried interest income in the near term, yet the stock may be priced as if near-term carry is imminent. The GAAP carried interest reversal in the quarter, driven by small changes in fair value failing to exceed preferred return hurdles, underscores the volatility and unpredictability of accrued carry, especially in early-to-mid life cycle funds. While management emphasizes the embedded value in the development pipeline (e.g., $1 billion of potential future carry from 5.4 gigawatts), this remains theoretical and unrealized, subject to years of execution risk, market shifts, and exit environment volatility. Investors may be overestimating the proximity of carry-driven upside, leading to disappointment if the market realizes that the bulk of value creation is locked in long-term infrastructure holds with no near-term liquidity events, making the stock vulnerable to a multiple compression if growth expectations are not met alongside tangible cash returns.

Segments Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

Companies in the Asset Management

S.No.	Ticker	Company	Market Cap	P/E	P/S	Total Debt (Qtr)
1	BN	BROOKFIELD Corp /ON/	1,236.60 Bn	1,022.83	16.33	15.06 Bn
2	BLK	BlackRock, Inc.	161.01 Bn	25.75	6.28	20.18 Bn
3	BX	Blackstone Inc.	97.77 Bn	16.04	6.62	13.28 Bn
4	APO	Apollo Global Management, Inc.	70.80 Bn	67.62	2.65	14.22 Bn
5	STT	State Street Corp	51.30 Bn	18.16	3.55	-
6	AMP	Ameriprise Financial Inc	48.54 Bn	12.46	1.74	0.20 Bn
7	NTRS	Northern Trust Corp	32.93 Bn	18.05	6.40	7.84 Bn
8	RJF	Raymond James Financial Inc	32.59 Bn	15.21	2.37	4.66 Bn

Research Tools

Developers

About

Investment Thesis

Product and Service Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Segments Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

Research Tools

Developers

About

Investment Thesis

Product and Service Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Segments Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

Create an account

Sign In

Reset Password