Commerce.com, Inc. (NASDAQ: CMRC)

$2.51 -0.13 (-4.75%)
As of Apr 13, 2026 03:59 PM
Sector: Technology Industry: Software - Application CIK: 0001626450
Market Cap 205.35 Mn
P/E -10.93
P/S 0.60
Div. Yield 0.00
ROIC (Qtr) -0.42
Total Debt (Qtr) 4.04 Mn
Revenue Growth (1y) (Qtr) 2.86
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About

BigCommerce Holdings, Inc., commonly recognized by its ticker symbol BIGC, is a prominent player in the software-as-a-service (SaaS) industry. The company specializes in streamlining the development of captivating online stores by offering a unique blend of ease-of-use, enterprise functionality, and flexibility. BigCommerce's platform is designed to empower businesses to harness digital transformation as a competitive edge, enabling merchants to construct their ecommerce solution in a manner that aligns with their distinct business and product offerings. BigCommerce's...

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Investment thesis

Bull case

  • Commerce.com’s 2025 results underscore a disciplined cost structure and the ability to convert incremental GMV into healthy cash flow, a foundation that can sustain the company’s aggressive R&D push in 2026. The firm reported a 3% revenue increase to $342 million, while non‑GAAP operating income climbed 28 % YoY, reflecting a narrowing margin gap that will allow additional capital to be re‑invested in product innovation. The company’s strategic focus on AI‑ready infrastructure, especially through the Surface and MakeSwift launches, positions it to capture value from the next wave of agentic commerce, which is expected to drive higher conversion rates and more repeat traffic across its B2B and B2C bases. With GMV growing at double‑digit rates—12% in 2025 and a projected 11%–12% annual growth—Commerce.com is already commanding significant scale, and this scale will likely translate into better pricing power for future product and payment offerings.
  • The newly introduced BigCommerce Payments, powered by PayPal, offers a turnkey, low‑friction payment solution that can dramatically increase merchant monetization without the traditional high acquisition costs of a full PSP. By channeling a large segment of existing merchants onto this branded solution, the company anticipates a gradual shift in take rates from lower‑margin B2B credit card transactions to higher‑margin payment processing, which should improve gross margins from the 80% baseline. Management’s detailed discussion of margin expectations—projecting 10%–14% non‑GAAP operating margin for the full year 2026—shows confidence that this monetization strategy will not only offset the inherent B2B discount but also provide a new revenue stream that can be scaled globally. The company’s near‑term roadmap also includes integration with Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini, and Perplexity, further broadening its AI ecosystem and creating additional cross‑sell opportunities that can lift ARPA over the next two to three years.
  • Commerce.com’s unified branding and simplification of the platform architecture have created a clearer value proposition for both large and small merchants, a move that is expected to accelerate the adoption curve of its product suite. By consolidating storefronts, product data, experience, and payments under the Commerce.com umbrella, the company reduces friction for merchants looking to upgrade from legacy systems, thus improving net revenue retention (NRR). The reported Q4 NRR of 95.2%—although still below 100—has improved from 95% in the previous year, indicating that the cross‑sell initiatives are beginning to pay off. Management’s emphasis on incremental NRR improvements, driven by Surface’s 24‑point GMV growth advantage and MakeSwift’s enhanced page‑building capabilities, suggests a realistic path to reach double‑digit NRR in the next 12–18 months. This improved retention will directly support higher recurring revenue and stabilize the company’s top line against cyclical e‑commerce swings.
  • The company’s B2B edition is gaining traction with enterprise customers, with subscription ARR from B2B clients rising nearly 20% in 2025. The expansion into industrial, manufacturing, and distribution segments—evidenced by new wins such as Build It Right and Premier Water Tanks—demonstrates the platform’s ability to serve complex, high‑volume merchants that require advanced inventory, pricing, and compliance features. As B2B commerce continues to dominate the e‑commerce market share, Commerce.com’s differentiated data enrichment and inventory orchestration capabilities position it to capture a larger slice of the global B2B GMV pool, potentially driving revenue growth that outpaces the broader e‑commerce index. The company’s claim of being a “B2B platform for enterprises” is further reinforced by its high retention rates among these customers, suggesting that churn risks are relatively low for this segment. Consequently, the firm is poised to convert the momentum from this sector into sustained ARR growth as more merchants upgrade to the enterprise tier.
  • Management’s decision to remove enterprise‑specific metrics and focus on holistic GMV and NRR reflects a maturation of the business model that prioritizes revenue quality over sheer account volume. This shift aligns investor expectations with the company’s core value drivers—product usage, data monetization, and payment processing—rather than the historical reliance on account counts that did not capture depth of engagement. By emphasizing GMV growth as the primary indicator of market share, the company provides a more accurate gauge of its competitive positioning against rivals such as Shopify, which may understate Commerce.com’s presence in the enterprise segment. The transparency offered by this new reporting approach is likely to strengthen investor confidence and reduce valuation pressure, as stakeholders can directly assess the impact of product launches and pricing changes on top‑line performance. The strategic emphasis on a unified metric is a signal that the firm is ready to scale in a data‑centric economy.

Bear case

  • Despite headline growth, net revenue retention remains below 100%, signalling that the company is still losing money from existing customers rather than expanding them. Management acknowledged that the current NRR of 95.2% is a “high‑class problem” and has yet to achieve the levels that are considered best‑in‑class for a platform business. The company’s reliance on cross‑sell initiatives—Surface, MakeSwift, and BigCommerce Payments—to lift NRR appears to be in early stages, and there is no guarantee these products will generate the incremental usage required to move NRR past 100%. Until the retention gap closes, recurring revenue will continue to erode margin pressure and could potentially lead to a decline in the customer base if competitors capitalize on the pain points. Thus, NRR remains a critical risk that could undermine the company’s projected revenue growth trajectory.
  • The company’s heavy focus on B2B expansion introduces a structural margin risk that is difficult to mitigate. While B2B ARR grew 20% in 2025, the associated GMV grew at a similar pace, yet the take rates on B2B transactions are lower due to a higher proportion of credit‑card‑free payment methods (ACH, PO, invoicing). Management’s own admission that the B2B mix causes a “slight decline in net take rates” underscores a fundamental pricing challenge. Even as the company introduces BigCommerce Payments, the shift from credit‑card to alternative payment methods in the B2B space is unlikely to happen quickly enough to offset the margin dilution. The resulting lower gross margins could erode profitability, especially if the company must invest heavily in customer acquisition or retention to keep pace with the larger B2C segment.
  • Agentic commerce, while positioned as a growth catalyst, carries significant execution uncertainty. The management team admitted that agentic commerce “has been a mixed bag” in terms of traffic generation, with some brands experiencing traffic drops due to re‑platforming uncertainty. The company’s own statements about “collateral damage” and the complexity of aligning agentic checkout with back‑office systems suggest that many merchants may be hesitant to adopt these new flows, thereby limiting the potential upside of the AI integration strategy. Moreover, the reliance on third‑party AI vendors (OpenAI, Microsoft, Google) introduces an additional layer of dependency that could expose Commerce.com to pricing, policy, or technical changes beyond its control. Until these challenges are resolved, agentic commerce may not deliver the anticipated revenue lift, and could instead dilute marketing and engineering resources.
  • The removal of enterprise‑specific metrics creates a reporting opacity that could obscure critical performance trends. By retiring enterprise ARR and related metrics, management has eliminated a key indicator of high‑value, long‑term revenue streams that are less sensitive to price changes. Investors must now rely on aggregate GMV and NRR figures, which blend B2B and B2C dynamics and can mask underperformance in either segment. The shift may lead to misinterpretation of the company's health, as GMV growth can be driven by low‑margin B2B transactions while ARR growth lags, creating a false sense of scale. This lack of granularity increases the risk of misaligned valuation multiples and could ultimately pressure the stock if the company fails to meet the underlying growth expectations.
  • Competitive pressure from larger, more diversified e‑commerce platforms remains a pervasive threat. While Commerce.com has differentiated itself with data enrichment and B2B capabilities, its main competitors (Shopify, Magento, Salesforce Commerce Cloud) have deeper engineering resources, larger merchant ecosystems, and broader payment integrations. The company's own acknowledgment that it is “one of only two commerce platforms featured” in Google’s universal commerce protocol highlights a rare advantage, but also underscores how limited its positioning is in an industry that is rapidly consolidating around a handful of dominant platforms. If competitors continue to invest aggressively in AI‑first commerce and partner ecosystems, they may capture the majority of the emerging “agentic” traffic, eroding Commerce.com’s market share and forcing the company into a price‑and‑margin war.

Product and Service Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Statement of Income Location, Balance Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer comparison

Companies in the Software - Application
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1 SAP Sap Se 242.55 Bn 24.03 5.44 9.39 Bn
2 CRM Salesforce, Inc. 185.17 Bn 21.96 4.46 14.44 Bn
3 UBER Uber Technologies, Inc 149.48 Bn 14.97 2.87 10.52 Bn
4 INTU Intuit Inc. 102.37 Bn 23.72 5.09 6.16 Bn
5 ADBE Adobe Inc. 97.42 Bn 13.97 3.98 0.85 Bn
6 NOW ServiceNow, Inc. 94.94 Bn 52.71 7.15 -
7 ADP Automatic Data Processing Inc 78.67 Bn 18.70 3.71 3.98 Bn
8 CDNS Cadence Design Systems Inc 78.28 Bn 70.25 14.78 2.48 Bn