Calumet, Inc. /DE (CLMT) Stock Analysis and Metrics

Calumet

NASDAQ: CLMT

$41.72 ▼ -1.10 (-2.57%)

At close: Jul 24, 2026 · 3:59 PM UTC

Financial Ratios

Market Cap3.63 Bn

P/E-12.84

P/S0.87

Div. Yield0.00

ROIC (Qtr)0.00

Total Debt (Qtr)2.33 Bn

Revenue Growth (1y) (Qtr)3.60

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About

Calumet, Inc. manufactures formulates and markets a diversified slate of specialty branded products and renewable fuels to customers across consumer facing and industrial markets. The company is headquartered in Indianapolis Indiana and operates twelve facilities throughout North America. Its operations are organized into reportable segments that include Specialty Products and Solutions Performance Brands Montana/Renewables and Corporate. This structure allows the firm to manage its varied product lines while maintaining a unified corporate strategy.

Calumet generates revenue primarily through the sale of its specialty chemicals performance branded products renewable fuels and asphalt. Specialty Products and Solutions supplies solvents waxes customized lubricating oils white oils petrolatums gels esters and other specialty chemicals to domestic and international customers who use them as raw material inputs for consumer and industrial goods. Performance Brands blends packages and markets high performance lubricants and fuels under the Royal Purple Bel-Ray and TruFuel brands to end users in the automotive powersports and industrial sectors. The Montana/Renewables segment produces renewable diesel sustainable aviation fuel renewable hydrogen renewable natural gas renewable propane and renewable naphtha at its Great Falls facility and also processes Canadian crude oil into conventional gasoline diesel jet fuel and specialty asphalt at its Montana facility. The Corporate segment does not generate direct revenue but supports the operating segments through general and administrative functions.

The company operates through the following reportable segments: Specialty Products and Solutions Performance Brands Montana/Renewables and Corporate.

• Specialty Products and Solutions manufactures and markets a wide variety of solvents waxes customized lubricating oils white oils petrolatums gels esters and other specialty chemicals. These products are sold to domestic and international customers who purchase them primarily as raw material components for consumer facing and industrial products.

• Performance Brands blends packages and markets high performance products through the Royal Purple Bel-Ray and TruFuel brands. The segment focuses on delivering premium lubricants and fuels to automotive powersports and industrial customers.

• Montana/Renewables consists of two facilities a renewable fuels plant at Great Falls and a specialty asphalt plant in Montana. The Great Falls facility processes geographically advantaged renewable feedstocks into renewable diesel sustainable aviation fuel renewable hydrogen renewable natural gas renewable propane and renewable naphtha which are distributed into renewable markets in the western half of North America. The Montana specialty asphalt facility processes Canadian crude oil into conventional gasoline diesel jet fuel and specialty grades of asphalt sized to serve local markets.

• The Corporate segment comprises general and administrative expenses that are not allocated to the Specialty Products and Solutions Performance Brands or Montana/Renewables segments. It provides corporate oversight support functions and strategic planning for the entire enterprise.

Calumet holds a competitive position as an integrated producer of specialty chemicals performance branded products and renewable fuels. Its first mover status in the renewable fuels market gives it an advantage when seeking offtake partners for sustainable aviation fuel and other low carbon fuels. The company benefits from a diversified product portfolio that allows it to shift emphasis between specialty chemicals and fuel products depending on market conditions. Its Montana operations enjoy a strategic location with direct access to cost advantaged Canadian crude oil which supports the profitability of its asphalt and fuels businesses. The firm’s internal expertise in managing complex feedstocks and its investments in asset reliability further strengthen its standing relative to peers in the specialty chemicals and renewable fuels sectors.

Calumet serves a broad customer base that includes manufacturers of consumer goods industrial users of lubricants and solvents automotive and powersports enthusiasts fuel distributors and regional asphalt customers. Specialty chemicals are sold to companies that incorporate them into final products such as personal care items industrial cleaners and plastic additives. Performance branded products reach end users through retail channels and professional service providers. Renewable fuels are supplied to blenders and marketers operating in the western half of North America while the specialty asphalt plant supplies local paving contractors and municipal agencies. This diversified customer mix helps the firm maintain steady demand across its various product lines.

Investment Thesis

▲ Bull case

Calumet's integrated business model provides a structural advantage that is significantly undervalued by the market, particularly in the current high-margin environment for fuels and specialties. Unlike non-integrated competitors who must purchase volatile intermediates like VGO or diesel as feedstock for specialty products, Calumet produces lubricants, solvents, and other high-value specialties directly from crude oil, capturing the full value chain from upstream refining to downstream formulation. This vertical integration allows the company to benefit disproportionately when crack spreads widen, as evidenced by management's statement that the 2026 full-year 2:1:1 crack spread is over $42 per barrel—nearly double the 2025 average—while still maintaining specialty margins of $54 per barrel in Q1 despite rapid crude inflation. The recent turnarounds at Cotton Valley and Princeton facilities, completed in April, have restored full operating capacity across the Specialties segment, enabling Calumet to capitalize on the current margin environment without operational constraints. Furthermore, the company's demonstrated commercial excellence—executing over 20 price increases in a short period to offset feedstock cost spikes—proves its ability to protect margins in volatile markets, a capability that is not fully reflected in current valuations. This integrated model not only supports accelerated deleveraging through strong cash flow generation but also creates a low-risk platform for reinvesting excess cash into high-return specialty growth opportunities, a strategic lever the market appears to be overlooking as it focuses narrowly on segment-level performance rather than the synergistic value of the whole business. The durability of this advantage is reinforced by Calumet's domestic crude supply chain, which insulates it from global disruptions affecting Middle Eastern-sourced LOOP crudes that are critical for specialty production elsewhere, providing a reliable, quality-controlled feedstock foundation that non-integrated peers cannot replicate.
The Montana Renewables (MRL) segment is at a pivotal inflection point with transformative growth potential that the market is failing to adequately price in, driven by the synergistic combination of the recently completed MaxSAF 150 expansion and the structurally supportive EPA Set 2 RVO framework. Management highlighted that the new capacity enables a four to fivefold increase in annual SAF volumes on a run-rate basis, supported by contractual SAF premiums of $1 to $2 per gallon over renewable diesel—premiums that are underpinned by durable demand from airlines seeking to meet decarbonization goals and supported by federal tax incentives like the 45Z credit. Importantly, the EPA's Set 2 RVO announcement corrected the critical flaw in the prior Set 1 rule by recognizing domestic feedstock availability, thereby reinstating a proven, decade-tested methodology that mandates increasing utilization levels to incentivize industry growth. This policy dynamic is creating a sustained tailwind: industry utilization must rise above historical levels to meet the mandate, and MRL's feedstock flexibility—enabled by its pretreatment capabilities—allows it to optimize input costs in real time, maintaining its industry-leading low cost structure (historically down to $0.38 per gallon OPEX) even as it scales SAF production. The recent commencement of operations post-expansion in early May, combined with the strong renewable diesel index margin exceeding $3 per gallon at quarter-end, indicates that the asset is not only operational but already generating strong cash flow in a favorable margin environment. Despite this, the market appears to be valuing MRL based on its historical performance under the depressed Set 1 regime, failing to recognize that the current RVO framework represents a structural shift—not a temporary cyclical uptick—toward higher, more sustainable utilization and margins for the entire biomass-based diesel sector. With MRL well-positioned to capture both the SAF premium and the broader renewable diesel upside, and with its asphalt business poised to benefit from seasonally stronger demand and supportive crack spreads in Q2, the renewables segment is on track to deliver meaningfully higher EBITDA than the $30–$50 million annual range cited for a "normal" environment, a prospect that remains underappreciated in today's valuation.
Calumet's deleveraging trajectory is significantly more advanced and less risky than market perceptions suggest, owing to the company's strategic use of cash flow from both its Specialties and Renewables segments to reduce debt without relying on asset sales, thereby preserving upside optionality. Management explicitly stated that the plan to monetize Montana Renewables remains unchanged but is not being accelerated, as the current focus is on showcasing the business's earnings power with the MaxSAF 150 expansion operational and the Set 2 RVO in place—a deliberate strategy to maximize value before any potential transaction. This approach is prudent and value-accretive, as it allows Calumet to benefit from the current strong margin environment in both fuels and specialties while using internally generated cash to pay down debt, a process already underway with the $150 million tack-on facility used to pre-reduce 2028 debt ahead of call protection stepping down in July. The company's liquidity position is robust, with working capital fluctuations from crude price run-ups already unwinding as seen in April, and inventory and receivables normalizing as the Shreveport organic chloride incident is fully resolved and the plant operates at 50,000 barrels per day. Crucially, Calumet has hedged approximately 25% of its 2026–2027 fuels production at attractive historical crack spread levels ($22–$27 per barrel on a 2:1:1 basis using CBOB), locking in cash flow certainty while preserving upside on the remaining unhedged production—a sophisticated risk management tactic that demonstrates financial discipline often overlooked in upstream/downstream pure plays. This deleveraging path, driven by operational cash flow rather than distressed asset sales, reduces financial leverage in a way that strengthens the balance sheet without sacrificing growth potential, a nuance the market is missing as it fixates on near-term earnings volatility from transient operational issues like the Shreveport downtime, which management confirmed is now behind us with no sustained damage and full operational recovery.

Calumet's integrated business model provides a structural advantage that is significantly undervalued by the market, particularly in the current high-margin environment for fuels and specialties. Unlike non-integrated competitors who must purchase volatile intermediates like VGO or diesel as feedstock for specialty products, Calumet produces lubricants, solvents, and other high-value specialties directly from crude oil, capturing the full value chain from upstream refining to downstream formulation. This vertical integration allows the company to benefit disproportionately when crack spreads widen, as evidenced by management's statement that the 2026 full-year 2:1:1 crack spread is over $42 per barrel—nearly double the 2025 average—while still maintaining specialty margins of $54 per barrel in Q1 despite rapid crude inflation. The recent turnarounds at Cotton Valley and Princeton facilities, completed in April, have restored full operating capacity across the Specialties segment, enabling Calumet to capitalize on the current margin environment without operational constraints. Furthermore, the company's demonstrated commercial excellence—executing over 20 price increases in a short period to offset feedstock cost spikes—proves its ability to protect margins in volatile markets, a capability that is not fully reflected in current valuations. This integrated model not only supports accelerated deleveraging through strong cash flow generation but also creates a low-risk platform for reinvesting excess cash into high-return specialty growth opportunities, a strategic lever the market appears to be overlooking as it focuses narrowly on segment-level performance rather than the synergistic value of the whole business. The durability of this advantage is reinforced by Calumet's domestic crude supply chain, which insulates it from global disruptions affecting Middle Eastern-sourced LOOP crudes that are critical for specialty production elsewhere, providing a reliable, quality-controlled feedstock foundation that non-integrated peers cannot replicate.
The Montana Renewables (MRL) segment is at a pivotal inflection point with transformative growth potential that the market is failing to adequately price in, driven by the synergistic combination of the recently completed MaxSAF 150 expansion and the structurally supportive EPA Set 2 RVO framework. Management highlighted that the new capacity enables a four to fivefold increase in annual SAF volumes on a run-rate basis, supported by contractual SAF premiums of $1 to $2 per gallon over renewable diesel—premiums that are underpinned by durable demand from airlines seeking to meet decarbonization goals and supported by federal tax incentives like the 45Z credit. Importantly, the EPA's Set 2 RVO announcement corrected the critical flaw in the prior Set 1 rule by recognizing domestic feedstock availability, thereby reinstating a proven, decade-tested methodology that mandates increasing utilization levels to incentivize industry growth. This policy dynamic is creating a sustained tailwind: industry utilization must rise above historical levels to meet the mandate, and MRL's feedstock flexibility—enabled by its pretreatment capabilities—allows it to optimize input costs in real time, maintaining its industry-leading low cost structure (historically down to $0.38 per gallon OPEX) even as it scales SAF production. The recent commencement of operations post-expansion in early May, combined with the strong renewable diesel index margin exceeding $3 per gallon at quarter-end, indicates that the asset is not only operational but already generating strong cash flow in a favorable margin environment. Despite this, the market appears to be valuing MRL based on its historical performance under the depressed Set 1 regime, failing to recognize that the current RVO framework represents a structural shift—not a temporary cyclical uptick—toward higher, more sustainable utilization and margins for the entire biomass-based diesel sector. With MRL well-positioned to capture both the SAF premium and the broader renewable diesel upside, and with its asphalt business poised to benefit from seasonally stronger demand and supportive crack spreads in Q2, the renewables segment is on track to deliver meaningfully higher EBITDA than the $30–$50 million annual range cited for a "normal" environment, a prospect that remains underappreciated in today's valuation.
Calumet's deleveraging trajectory is significantly more advanced and less risky than market perceptions suggest, owing to the company's strategic use of cash flow from both its Specialties and Renewables segments to reduce debt without relying on asset sales, thereby preserving upside optionality. Management explicitly stated that the plan to monetize Montana Renewables remains unchanged but is not being accelerated, as the current focus is on showcasing the business's earnings power with the MaxSAF 150 expansion operational and the Set 2 RVO in place—a deliberate strategy to maximize value before any potential transaction. This approach is prudent and value-accretive, as it allows Calumet to benefit from the current strong margin environment in both fuels and specialties while using internally generated cash to pay down debt, a process already underway with the $150 million tack-on facility used to pre-reduce 2028 debt ahead of call protection stepping down in July. The company's liquidity position is robust, with working capital fluctuations from crude price run-ups already unwinding as seen in April, and inventory and receivables normalizing as the Shreveport organic chloride incident is fully resolved and the plant operates at 50,000 barrels per day. Crucially, Calumet has hedged approximately 25% of its 2026–2027 fuels production at attractive historical crack spread levels ($22–$27 per barrel on a 2:1:1 basis using CBOB), locking in cash flow certainty while preserving upside on the remaining unhedged production—a sophisticated risk management tactic that demonstrates financial discipline often overlooked in upstream/downstream pure plays. This deleveraging path, driven by operational cash flow rather than distressed asset sales, reduces financial leverage in a way that strengthens the balance sheet without sacrificing growth potential, a nuance the market is missing as it fixates on near-term earnings volatility from transient operational issues like the Shreveport downtime, which management confirmed is now behind us with no sustained damage and full operational recovery.

▼ Bear case

Calumet's Specialties business faces significant near-term margin pressure and demand uncertainty that the market is underestimating, particularly due to the lagged impact of price increases in its Performance Brands segment and the structural challenge of passing through extreme feedstock volatility to end customers. While management highlighted successful price increases across over 20 product lines in the Specialties and Solutions (SPS) business, they acknowledged that Performance Brands—including TRUFUEL—experiences a 60 to 90-day lag in reflecting price changes, compared to less than one month in SPS. This means that the full benefit of recent price actions will not flow through until late Q2 or early Q3, leaving margins vulnerable in the interim if crude prices remain elevated or increase further. Furthermore, the company's reliance on passing through cost increases assumes customer acceptance and inelastic demand, yet management conceded that they are monitoring "general consumer sentiment and market volatility" as determinants of how long current demand strength will last—an implicit recognition that demand could deteriorate if macroeconomic conditions worsen or if consumers begin to substitute away from higher-priced specialty products. The historical analogy to 2022, when specialty margins reached $90 per barrel, is misleading because current margins are explicitly described as "a tad lower than 2022" even with fuel margins "a tad higher than 2022," suggesting the blended environment may not deliver the same level of earnings power. Additionally, the integration advantage—while real—may be overstated if global supply chain disruptions persist, as Calumet's domestic crude insulation does not eliminate exposure to broader macroeconomic risks that could suppress industrial demand for lubes, solvents, and performance additives, especially if manufacturing activity slows. The market may be pricing in a sustained high-margin environment based on recent strength, but the company's own commentary reveals awareness that such conditions are not permanent, and the ability to maintain current margin levels depends on continued success in price execution and demand resilience—factors that are not guaranteed and could reverse quickly if the current geopolitical or macroeconomic backdrop shifts.
The Montana Renewables segment's path to sustained profitability and growth is far more uncertain than management suggests, due to unresolved feedstock cost volatility, uncertain timing of federal tax credit cash flows, and the structural challenge of scaling SAF production without compromising operational efficiency or margins. Although Bruce Fleming emphasized the company's "essentially unlimited feedstock flexibility" and pretreatment capabilities, this flexibility does not eliminate cost volatility—it merely allows reactive optimization, meaning MRL remains exposed to swings in soybean oil, corn oil, or used cooking oil prices, which can fluctuate widely based on agricultural yields, export demand, and competing biofuel mandates globally. The recent history of the biodiesel industry under Set 1 showed how feedstock cost pressures can undermine profitability even when mandates exist, and while Set 2 corrects the availability assumption, it does not guarantee stable or declining feedstock costs. Furthermore, the $1 to $2 per gallon SAF premium cited by management is contractual but not necessarily durable; evergreen contracts with 2–3 year notice periods could see downward pressure at renewal if market conditions change, especially if new SAF entrants increase supply or if airline demand for SAF softens due to economic headwinds. Critically, the 45Z tax credit—which management referenced as a key enabler—is not yet delivering cash flow at the scale needed to incentivize marginal producers, as Conor Fitzpatrick of BofA noted regarding the "ability to have the actual cash inflow from 45Z credits soon enough." Until these credits are reliably monetized and transferred to producers, the economics of scaling SAF remain dependent on volatile credit markets and policy execution risk, not just underlying fundamentals. Finally, the claim that MRL can achieve a "four to fivefold increase in SAF volumes" assumes seamless scaling, yet the operational commentary revealed ongoing challenges: the unit required a second restream due to an electrical power interruption, catalyst conditioning is still underway, and performance validation is weeks away—indicating that the asset is not yet at steady state, and early-stage operational hiccups could persist, undermining the expected margin profile and cash flow conversion.
Calumet's deleveraging plan and liquidity position are more fragile than presented, due to the lingering working capital impacts of commodity volatility, the speculative nature of hedging gains/losses, and the overreliance on continued strong market conditions to generate the cash flow needed for debt reduction. David Lunin acknowledged that the crude price run-up caused a "big draw on working capital" exceeding $100 million in accounts receivable, with an "almost total unwind" only beginning in April—meaning the full benefit of this reversal has not yet been realized and remains contingent on stable or declining crude prices. If prices rebound or remain elevated, the working capital drag could persist, consuming cash that would otherwise go toward debt repayment. Furthermore, the company's crack spread hedges, while intended to derisk fuels production, resulted in approximately $6 million of realized hedge losses during Q1—a direct hit to cash flow that underscores the risk of locking in hedges at levels that may prove unprofitable if the market moves contrary to expectations. Although management framed these as "attractive historical levels," the fact that they incurred losses reveals that the market moved significantly beyond those strike prices, and future hedge performance is highly uncertain given the volatility driven by Middle Eastern conflicts. The $150 million tack-on facility used to pre-reduce 2028 debt is a temporary liquidity tool, not a permanent solution, and its usefulness depends on maintaining access to favorable credit markets—a condition that could deteriorate if leverage ratios do not improve sufficiently or if macroeconomic stress widens credit spreads. Most critically, the entire deleveraging thesis hinges on the assumption that the current strong margin environment in both fuels and specialties will persist long enough to generate sufficient cash flow, yet management itself described the environment as "not something that lasts forever" and acknowledged that "we could see increased volatility from here." If the market reverts to a more normalized state—particularly if crack spreads compress or specialty demand weakens—the cash flow engine that underpins the deleveraging plan could falter, leaving the company with elevated leverage and fewer options, a scenario the market is not adequately pricing in as it focuses on the current tailwinds without sufficiently stress-testing their durability.

Calumet's Specialties business faces significant near-term margin pressure and demand uncertainty that the market is underestimating, particularly due to the lagged impact of price increases in its Performance Brands segment and the structural challenge of passing through extreme feedstock volatility to end customers. While management highlighted successful price increases across over 20 product lines in the Specialties and Solutions (SPS) business, they acknowledged that Performance Brands—including TRUFUEL—experiences a 60 to 90-day lag in reflecting price changes, compared to less than one month in SPS. This means that the full benefit of recent price actions will not flow through until late Q2 or early Q3, leaving margins vulnerable in the interim if crude prices remain elevated or increase further. Furthermore, the company's reliance on passing through cost increases assumes customer acceptance and inelastic demand, yet management conceded that they are monitoring "general consumer sentiment and market volatility" as determinants of how long current demand strength will last—an implicit recognition that demand could deteriorate if macroeconomic conditions worsen or if consumers begin to substitute away from higher-priced specialty products. The historical analogy to 2022, when specialty margins reached $90 per barrel, is misleading because current margins are explicitly described as "a tad lower than 2022" even with fuel margins "a tad higher than 2022," suggesting the blended environment may not deliver the same level of earnings power. Additionally, the integration advantage—while real—may be overstated if global supply chain disruptions persist, as Calumet's domestic crude insulation does not eliminate exposure to broader macroeconomic risks that could suppress industrial demand for lubes, solvents, and performance additives, especially if manufacturing activity slows. The market may be pricing in a sustained high-margin environment based on recent strength, but the company's own commentary reveals awareness that such conditions are not permanent, and the ability to maintain current margin levels depends on continued success in price execution and demand resilience—factors that are not guaranteed and could reverse quickly if the current geopolitical or macroeconomic backdrop shifts.
The Montana Renewables segment's path to sustained profitability and growth is far more uncertain than management suggests, due to unresolved feedstock cost volatility, uncertain timing of federal tax credit cash flows, and the structural challenge of scaling SAF production without compromising operational efficiency or margins. Although Bruce Fleming emphasized the company's "essentially unlimited feedstock flexibility" and pretreatment capabilities, this flexibility does not eliminate cost volatility—it merely allows reactive optimization, meaning MRL remains exposed to swings in soybean oil, corn oil, or used cooking oil prices, which can fluctuate widely based on agricultural yields, export demand, and competing biofuel mandates globally. The recent history of the biodiesel industry under Set 1 showed how feedstock cost pressures can undermine profitability even when mandates exist, and while Set 2 corrects the availability assumption, it does not guarantee stable or declining feedstock costs. Furthermore, the $1 to $2 per gallon SAF premium cited by management is contractual but not necessarily durable; evergreen contracts with 2–3 year notice periods could see downward pressure at renewal if market conditions change, especially if new SAF entrants increase supply or if airline demand for SAF softens due to economic headwinds. Critically, the 45Z tax credit—which management referenced as a key enabler—is not yet delivering cash flow at the scale needed to incentivize marginal producers, as Conor Fitzpatrick of BofA noted regarding the "ability to have the actual cash inflow from 45Z credits soon enough." Until these credits are reliably monetized and transferred to producers, the economics of scaling SAF remain dependent on volatile credit markets and policy execution risk, not just underlying fundamentals. Finally, the claim that MRL can achieve a "four to fivefold increase in SAF volumes" assumes seamless scaling, yet the operational commentary revealed ongoing challenges: the unit required a second restream due to an electrical power interruption, catalyst conditioning is still underway, and performance validation is weeks away—indicating that the asset is not yet at steady state, and early-stage operational hiccups could persist, undermining the expected margin profile and cash flow conversion.
Calumet's deleveraging plan and liquidity position are more fragile than presented, due to the lingering working capital impacts of commodity volatility, the speculative nature of hedging gains/losses, and the overreliance on continued strong market conditions to generate the cash flow needed for debt reduction. David Lunin acknowledged that the crude price run-up caused a "big draw on working capital" exceeding $100 million in accounts receivable, with an "almost total unwind" only beginning in April—meaning the full benefit of this reversal has not yet been realized and remains contingent on stable or declining crude prices. If prices rebound or remain elevated, the working capital drag could persist, consuming cash that would otherwise go toward debt repayment. Furthermore, the company's crack spread hedges, while intended to derisk fuels production, resulted in approximately $6 million of realized hedge losses during Q1—a direct hit to cash flow that underscores the risk of locking in hedges at levels that may prove unprofitable if the market moves contrary to expectations. Although management framed these as "attractive historical levels," the fact that they incurred losses reveals that the market moved significantly beyond those strike prices, and future hedge performance is highly uncertain given the volatility driven by Middle Eastern conflicts. The $150 million tack-on facility used to pre-reduce 2028 debt is a temporary liquidity tool, not a permanent solution, and its usefulness depends on maintaining access to favorable credit markets—a condition that could deteriorate if leverage ratios do not improve sufficiently or if macroeconomic stress widens credit spreads. Most critically, the entire deleveraging thesis hinges on the assumption that the current strong margin environment in both fuels and specialties will persist long enough to generate sufficient cash flow, yet management itself described the environment as "not something that lasts forever" and acknowledged that "we could see increased volatility from here." If the market reverts to a more normalized state—particularly if crack spreads compress or specialty demand weakens—the cash flow engine that underpins the deleveraging plan could falter, leaving the company with elevated leverage and fewer options, a scenario the market is not adequately pricing in as it focuses on the current tailwinds without sufficiently stress-testing their durability.

Subsegments Consolidation Items Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

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1	LIN	Linde Plc	237.95 Bn	33.52	6.87	24.68 Bn
2	SHW	Sherwin Williams Co	78.17 Bn	30.07	3.27	11.70 Bn
3	ECL	Ecolab Inc.	76.02 Bn	30.01	4.73	8.24 Bn
4	APD	Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.	66.38 Bn	47.14	5.33	17.40 Bn
5	PPG	Ppg Industries Inc	26.02 Bn	3,717.41	1.61	7.83 Bn
6	LYB	LyondellBasell Industries N.V.	22.51 Bn	-28.53	0.76	11.45 Bn
7	SQM	Chemical & Mining Co Of Chile Inc	19.70 Bn	21.77	3.72	4.79 Bn
8	IFF	International Flavors & Fragrances Inc	19.51 Bn	-102.16	1.81	5.82 Bn

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Investment Thesis

Subsegments Consolidation Items Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Subsegments Consolidation Items Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

Research Tools

Developers

About

Investment Thesis

Subsegments Consolidation Items Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Subsegments Consolidation Items Breakdown of Revenue (2025)

Peer Comparison

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